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How	European	integration	breaks	the	link	between
demand	for	social	spending	and	its	supply
How	does	European	integration	affect	the	welfare	state?	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Tobias	Tober	highlights	two
conflicting	effects	that	the	integration	process	generates	in	relation	to	welfare	spending.	While	economic	integration
increases	popular	demand	for	social	spending,	political	integration	decreases	its	supply,	effectively	breaking	the	link
between	social	policy	preferences	and	social	policy	output.
For	decades,	a	prominent	line	of	critique	has	held	that	the	European	integration	process	is	strongly	biased	towards
economic	interests	and	neglects	the	social	policy	dimension.	Proponents	of	this	view	argue	that	the	asymmetry
between	market-making	and	market-correcting	efforts	has	resulted	in	a	European	agenda	of	labour	market
deregulation	and	privatisation.	These	authors	claim	that	the	few	remaining	national	options	under	the	alleged
liberalisation	regime	of	the	European	Union	are	on	the	supply	side,	including	increasing	wage	differentiation	and
welfare	state	cutbacks	(e.g.,	here	and	here).
Given	this	longstanding	critique,	it	is	surprising	that	empirical	studies	have	rarely	tested	the	impact	of	European
integration	on	the	welfare	state	(see	here	for	a	review).	Together	with	my	co-author,	Marius	Busemeyer,	we	try	to	fill
this	gap	in	the	literature	in	a	recent	study.	We	argue	that	European	integration	has	non-complementary
consequences	for	the	political	economy	of	welfare	spending.	While	European	economic	integration	increases
popular	demand	for	social	spending,	European	political	integration	decreases	the	supply	of	social	spending.	Thus,
the	conflicting	implications	of	European	integration	essentially	break	the	link	between	social	policy	preferences	and
social	policy	output.
Our	argument
On	the	demand	side,	we	draw	on	an	argument	that	is	known	as	the	‘compensation	thesis’.	It	claims	that	intensified
economic	integration	increases	economic	insecurity	among	workers,	which	in	turn	triggers	increased	public	demand
for	social	insurance	and	redistributive	compensation	from	the	welfare	state.	In	a	nutshell,	we	highlight	two	major
channels	through	which	European	economic	integration	may	contribute	to	more	economic	insecurity.
First,	the	single	market	of	the	EU	has	increased	economic	competition	and	has	created	new	exit	options	for	mobile
factors	of	production.	These	trends	exert	significant	downward	pressures	on	wages	and	employment	conditions.
Second,	it	is	much	more	difficult	for	trade	unions	to	organise	effectively	at	the	European	level	than	in	the	national
arena.	Thus,	their	ability	to	protect	workers	from	adverse	market	forces	declines.	Usually	applied	to	globalisation,
we	argue	that	the	individual-level	logic	of	the	compensation	thesis	is	particularly	relevant	in	the	context	of	the	EU
because	economic	integration	in	the	single	market	is	reinforced	by	the	process	of	political	integration,	which	is
heavily	geared	toward	promoting	the	removal	of	trade	barriers	and	the	creation	of	harmonised	markets.
On	the	supply	side,	our	argument	focuses	on	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	(EMU)	and	how	its	fiscal	rules	​​​​​​–
the	Maastricht	convergence	criteria	and	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	–	have	a	structurally	constraining	impact	on
member	states.	Although	critics	have	questioned	the	effectiveness	of	these	fiscal	rules,	empirical	research	has
repeatedly	shown	that	membership	of	the	EMU	depresses	government	spending,	especially	in	the	area	of	social
policy	(e.g.,	here	and	here).	Thus,	while	European	economic	integration	fuels	public	demand	for	compensation
(indicated	as	H1	in	Figure	1	below),	European	political	integration	delimits	the	fiscal	leeway	of	national-level
policymakers	to	supply	social	policy.	European	integration	therefore	provokes	a	mismatch	between	demand	and
supply,	essentially	breaking	the	opinion-policy	link	(shown	as	H2	in	Figure	1).
Figure	1:	European	integration	and	the	political	economy	of	welfare	spending
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Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	at	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy.
Empirical	results
To	test	these	hypotheses,	we	adopt	a	two-step	approach.	First,	to	estimate	how	individual	demand	for
compensation	responds	to	country-level	variation	in	European	integration,	we	apply	a	Bayesian	mixed-effects
modelling	strategy	that	draws	on	five	waves	of	the	European	Social	Survey	covering	22	member	states	between
2004	and	2012.	We	measure	demand	for	compensation	by	an	item	asking	respondents	whether	they	agree	with	the
statement	that	government	should	reduce	income	differences.	The	measure	of	European	integration	distinguishes
between	economic	and	political	integration.	The	economic	dimension	captures	openness	to	EU	trade	and	the
importance	of	EU	trade	to	trade	relations	outside	the	EU.	The	political	dimension	combines	information	on
institutional	participation	with	data	on	member	states’	compliance	with	EU	law	(see	here	for	more	detail).
Controlling	for	a	range	of	individual	and	country-level	factors,	we	find	that	within-country	changes	in	both	economic
and	political	integration	are	associated	with	more	popular	demand	for	compensation.	To	make	the	effects	more
tangible,	Figure	2	presents	average	marginal	predicted	probabilities	based	on	one	of	our	models.	For	both
economic	and	political	integration,	an	increase	of	one	standard	deviation	is	associated	with	an	increase	in	the
predicted	probability	by	about	one	percentage	point.	When	we	break	down	political	integration	into	its	two
subindicators,	we	find	that	the	effect	is	exclusively	driven	by	compliance	with	EU	law	and	not	institutional
participation.	The	major	element	of	legal	compliance	is	compliance	with	the	rules	of	the	single	market.	This
suggests	that	the	economic	logic	of	the	compensation	thesis	is	particularly	relevant	in	the	context	of	the	EU	due	to
the	legal	reinforcement	of	European	political	integration.
Figure	2:	Average	marginal	predicted	probability	of	demand	for	social	policy	by	within-country	economic
and	political	integration	with	95%	confidence	intervals
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In	the	second	step	of	the	analysis,	we	employ	time-series	cross-section	models	controlling	for	a	battery	of	potential
confounders,	which	regress	data	on	government	social	spending	on	our	measure	of	European	integration.	The
results	show	that	political	integration	has	a	depressing	effect	on	social	expenditure	and	that	this	effect	is	mostly
driven	by	institutional	participation,	in	particular	membership	in	the	EMU.	Moreover,	we	find	that	aggregated	social
policy	preferences	have	no	statistically	significant	relationship	with	social	spending,	implying	that	governments	are
not	responsive	to	citizens’	demands.
In	Figure	3,	we	probe	whether	this	lack	of	policy	responsiveness	is	conditional	on	institutional	participation	in	the
EU,	where	a	value	of	100	indicates	EMU	membership.	The	results	suggest	that	governments’	responsiveness	to
social	policy	preferences	declines	as	institutional	participation	in	the	EU	increases,	with	EMU	members	exhibiting
no	detectable	(positive)	association	between	popular	demands	and	actual	policy	output	(for	lower	income	groups	in
Panel	B,	the	association	even	appears	to	be	negative	in	the	EMU).	Given	the	small	sample	size	on	which	these
interaction	results	rest,	they	have	to	be	treated	with	caution.	Nevertheless,	we	take	the	fact	that	the	remaining
variation	in	the	data	bears	out	the	theorised	relationship	as	suggestive	evidence	for	our	argument.
Figure	3:	Marginal	effect	of	social	policy	preferences	on	social	policy	supply	conditional	on	institutional
participation	with	95%	confidence	intervals
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Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	at	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy.
We	believe	that	these	findings	have	important	political	implications.	In	the	wake	of	the	Eurozone	crisis,	various
austerity	measures	were	implemented	that	can	be	seen	as	a	stricter	continuation	of	EMU’s	fiscal	rules.	At	the	same
time,	the	crisis	led	to	escalating	levels	of	unemployment	and	a	significant	drop	in	wages	in	some	of	the	member
states.	These	developments	suggest	that	the	contradictory	impact	of	European	integration	on	the	political	economy
of	social	policy	persists	and	will	potentially	intensify	in	the	future.
The	growing	mismatch	between	demand	for	social	policy	and	actual	supply	may	contribute	to	low	levels	of	trust	in
national	and	European	institutions,	and	thus	undermine	their	perceived	legitimacy.	This	would	create	further
breeding	ground	for	populist	challengers	to	the	European	political	system,	in	particular	if	the	social	dimension	of	the
European	integration	process	continues	to	be	neglected.
For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	paper	at	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy	(co-
authored	with	Marius	R.	Busemeyer)
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	European	Council
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